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Missouri courts have applied a variety of tests for determining the
validity of covenants not to compete. The result has often been to con-
fuse the attorney called upon to draft such a covenant as to what must or
must not be included therein. Although the balancing of a myriad of
factors is involved, the courts should find such a covenant valid and en-
forceable only if it is found to be reasonable as to the covenantee, the
covenantor, and the public. The resulting flexibility will become even
more important in the future as the courts will be forced, in the absence
of adequate statutory regulation, to deal with new attempts to limit com-
petition contractually. By concentrating on the general concept of reason-
ableness, Missouri courts can avoid the temptation to rely on mechanical
rules and place more emphasis on the equities involved in the given case.
HAROLD WILLIAm HINDERER III
LOCAL GOVERNMENT-COUNTY HOME RULE
AND THE 1970 MISSOURI
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri is credited with giving municipal home rule its start in
1875,1 and is one of at least seventeen states that authorizes all or some
counties to adopt a home rule charter.2 These states have done so in an
attempt to create governmental authority which can "span the metropolitan
area from city to suburb and unify the resources of the area with metro-
politan wide responsibility." 3 Problems of pollution, traffic control, sew-
age and waste disposal, water and utility supply, health care, and welfare
financing require effective uniform county solution, without the delay of
obtaining approval from the state legislature. This feature is thought to
be embodied in county- home rule. Home rule under a charter government
can serve as:
[B]oth a political symbol and a legal concept. As a political symbol
it serves as a rallying point for those who support local autonomy
without undue interference by the state government. As a legal
concept its basic function is to distribute power between the
state and local governments.4
N.Y.2d 293, 296 N.Y.S.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 49 (1968). To be completely safe, how-
ever, the draftsman should include a clause saying that -the liquidated damages
provision is not intended to be in lieu of equitable relief.
1. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 16 (1875).
2. Glauberman, County Home Rule: An Urban Necessity, 1 URBAN LAWYER
170 (1969).
3. Id.
4. Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Ex-
perience, 33 Mo. L. REv. 45, 46 (1968).
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The Missouri constitution requires counties to be grouped into four
classes 5 and the legislature has done so, basing the classification on as-
sessed valuation. 6 The constitution provides that the organization and
powers of each class of county shall be defined by uniform general laws,7
but it further provides that counties with a population of 85,000 or more
may. frame and adopt a home rule charter form of government.8
The primary goal of county home rule is to give counties a certain
level of local autonomy by enabling them to act without prior authoriza-
tion from the state legislature. Prior to 1970, the charter county's source of
power was embodied in article VI, section 18 (c) of the Missouri constitu-
tion:
The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legis-
lative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, build-
ing construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the
county outside incorporated cities; and it may provide, or au-
thorize its governing body to provide, the terms upon which the
county shall perform any of the services and functions of any mu-
nicipality, or political subdivision in the county, except school
districts, when accepted by vote of a majority of the qualified
electors voting thereon in the municipality or subdivision, which
acceptance may be revoked by like vote.
This section was amended in 1970 and now reads as follows:
The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legisla-
tive power pertaining to any and all services and functions of any
municipality or political subdivision, except school districts, in
the part of the county outside incorporated cities; and it may
provide, or authorize its governing body to provide, the terms
upon which the county may contract with any municipality
or political subdivision in the county and perform any of the
services and functions of any such municipality or political sub-
division.
The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legis-
lative power pertaining to any and all services and functions
of any municipality or political subdivision, except school districts,
throughout the entire county within as well as outside incorpo-
rated municipalities; any such charter provision shall set forth
the limits within which the municipalities may exercise the same
power collaterally and coextensively. When such a proposition is
submitted to the voters of the County the ballot shall contain a
clear definition of the power, function or service to be performed
and the method by which it will be financed.
This amendment has ostensibly given charter counties more and broader
powers in dealing with county problems and providing county services.
St. Louis County adopted the charter .form of government in 1950,
5. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
6. § 48.020, RSMo 1969.
7. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
8. Mo. CONsr. art. VI, § 18(a).
[Vol. 41
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and Jackson County did likewise in 1970. 9 Five other Missouri counties
now have sufficient population to qualify for charters and two more seem
on the verge of qualification. 10 There has also been a recent movement
for a constitutional amendment lowering the population requirement
to 80,000.11 Because of this increase in the number of counties eligible
for charter rule, section 18(c) of the Missouri constitution should become
increasingly important. This comment will attempt to analyze problem
areas solved and possibly created by the 1970 constitutional amendment
to section 18(c).
For the purpose of analysis, charter counties should be compared with
statutory counties.
II. THE STATUTORY COUNTY
A. Organization And Magnitude of Power
The organization of the government of all Missouri counties, except
for the two charter counties, is a creature of state statute. The county
court' 2 is the basis of county government, performing both legislative and
executive or administrative functions. One important administrative
function is the review of the budget of each county department. Although
it is called a court and its officials are called judges, the county court
performs. no judicial function. The court is composed of three or fewer
judges who are elected officials. Other major elected administrative
officials in statutory county government are the derk, collector of revenue,
assessor, treasurer, prosecuting attorney, sheriff, coroner, recorder of deeds,
surveyor, and highway engineer.13
Statutory counties may exercise only those powers granted to them
by the state. This principle has become known as Dillon's Rule, which
was expressed in Lancaster v. County of Atchison.14 Dillon's Rule states
that the only powers which counties may exercise are: (1) those granted
in express words; (2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
9. Freilich, Robards & Wilson, Home Rule for the Urban County: Observa-
tions on the New Jackson County Constitutional Charter, 39 U.M.K.C.L. Rnv. 297
(1971).
10. Buchanan County (86,915), Clay County (123,702), Greene County
(152,929), Jefferson County (105,647), and St. Charles County (92,986) all qualify
for charters. Boone County (80,911) and Jasper County (79,852) almost meet the
population requirement. 1973-1974 OFrICIAL MANUAL, STATE OF Missouti at 1164.
The University of Missouri-Columbia, Governmental Affairs Newsletter, Vol.
VII, Issue 3, at 2 (1972), indicates that Jefferson County voters narrowly rejected
a charter proposal, Buchanan County was in the drafting process and readying for
a vote, and Greene County was circulating petitions for a charter commission.
St. Charles County voters defeated a charter proposal on May 6, 1975. St. Louis
Globe Democrat, May 7, 1975, at 12B, col. 2.
11. Senate Joint Resolution No. 17 was introduced in the 78th General As-
sembly by Senators Marshall and Wiggins, calling for a constitutional amendment
lowering the population requirement to 80,000. Amendments were also proposed
to sections 18(b) and 18(f) of article VI. See pt. IV, § E of this comment, infra.
12. § 49.010, RSMo 1969.
13. §§ 51.010-61.010, RSMo 1969.
14. 352 Mo. 1039, 180 S.AV.2d 706 (1944).
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to the powers expressly granted; or (3) those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the county-i.e., powers that are indispensable
and not merely convenient. If there is reasonable doubt about a county
having a particular power, the courts resolve the doubt against the
county. Because of the rule, the county must look to the state legislature
for its power, and the power must be clearly stated or implied beyond
reasonable doubt.
The legislature has distributed these powers among the four classes
of counties, with some statutes pertaining to one or more counties and
some pertaining to all. The index to Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes
indicates some twenty pages devoted to indexing legislation for the City
of St. Louis and St. Louis County. Although St. Louis County has had
a home rule charter since 1950, much of the state legislation has been
passed at the county's request, apparently as a precautionary measure.
This indicates at least some amount of uncertainty as to what 'powers
charter counties may exercise independent of authorizing legislation.
The restrictive nature of a statutory county's power has been at
least partially responsible for the formation of many special districts
in Missouri. As of 1968, Missouri was eleventh in the nation in number
of local government units. Missouri contained 2,918 units, consisting of
school districts, townships, counties, municipalities, and 734 special dis-
tricts.15 Forming a special district is often the only feasible method of ob-
taining a desired service, although such a district may also be formed in or-
der to avoid the constitutional limitation an debt 16 or to finance a project
of countywide interest. 17 Whatever the reason for formation, special dis-
tricts are very cumbersome and often stand in the way of more compre-
hensive treatment of a problem.
B. The Case Law
The fact that statutory counties, under Dillon's Rule, possess no
powers except those conferred by statute has resulted in a less than vol-
uminous amount of case law concerning the exercise of powers by statu-
tory counties. Although the cases which have been decided seem quite
reasonable,' 8 the question remains as to why there have been so few
decisions. There are at least two possible reasons for this. It could
15. Missouri Has Too Many Local Governments, 24 J. Mo. B. 499' (1968).
Missouri had 57% of all road districts in the United States. A charter county,
St. Louis County, had 153 units of government, with 32 special districts. Id.'at 499,
500.
16. Mo. CoNsr. art. VI, § 26(a).
17. The Jackson County Sports Complex Authority was created by special
legislation. See § 64.930, RSMo 1969; Freilich, Robards & Wilson, supra note 9.
18. Counties were found not to possess the powers contested in County of
Platte v. James, 489 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. 1973) (county had no power tdl impose
zoning restrictions on incorporated area, even though the government of the
corporate area was not functional and had not been for some time), Fulton Nat'l
Bank v. Callaway Memorial Hosp., 465 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1971) (county hospital
had no authority to endorse notes with recourse, and therefore was not liable
when notes were not subsequently paid); State ex rel. Crites v. West, 509 S.W.2d
[Vol. 41
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mean that the counties have enough powers under the statutes to deal with
their problems. It seems more probable, however, that reported decisions
are few because county officials are very reluctant to act unless dearly
authorized by statute. One of the principal reasons for adopting a home
rule charter is to avoid the necessity of relying wholly upon legislative
authorization for power.
III. THE CHARTER COUNTY
A. Case Law Under the Prior Section 18(c)
Grants of power to charter counties have seemingly been restricted
in much the same manner that powers of statutory counties have been
restricted by Dillon's Rule. This restriction has been in the form of
judicial decision. In State ex rel. Town of Olivette v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co.19 it was stated that the county charter embodies the
powers charter counties may exercise, and acts beyond the powers granted
or necessarily implied in the charter are void. In Schmoll v. Housing Au-
thority of St. Louis County20 the Missouri Supreme Court described St.
Louis County's charter as its "fundamental organic law" and said that a
charter county must look to its charter for its powers.
Language in both the Jackson County and St. Louis County char-
ters attempts to escape this restrictive interpretation of charter power by
asserting that "all powers possible for a county to have under the con-
stitution and laws of Missouri .... ,,1 reside in charter counties, and
that powers under the charter shall be liberally construed in favor of the
county.22 To date, no decision by Missouri courts has indicated whether
such language is effective in avoiding the restrictive interpretation of
charter power. There is, however, dictum in Readey v. St. Louis County
Water Co. 23 indicating that the Missouri Supreme Court was ready to
482 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974) (power to dissolve a special fire protection district
was not necessary to or implied from express powers given by statute).
Implied powers to carry out the contested function were found in Everett V.
County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955) (power of county to operate a
rock quarry was implied from the power to own real estate, construct and improve
roads, and condemn rock quarries for public purposes); State ex rel. Wahl v. Speer,
284 Mo. 45, 223 S.W. 655 (En Banc 1920) (statute empowering county to incur
debt to "build" a courthouse, implied spending the borrowed money for expan-
sion of the old courthouse site): Blades v. Hawkins, 133 Mo. App. 328, 112 S.W.
979 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908), affd per curiam, 240 Mo. 187, 144 S.W. 1198 (1912)
(power of county court to hire an accountant to examine county records was
implied from express power making county court the fiscal agent of the. county);
Sheidley v. Lynch, 95 Mo. 487, 8 S.W. 434 (1888) (power of county to erect a court-
house at county seat implied the power to purchase the necessary land).
19. 280 S.W.2d 134 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
20. 321 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1959).
21. St. Louis County Charter art. I, § 1.030 (1968). Jackson County Charter
art. I, § 3 (1970), is virtually identical.
22. Jackson County Charter art. I, § 5 (1970); St. Louis County Charter art.
I, § 1.040 (1968).
23. 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961).
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accept such language in a similar but earlier charter provision.24 If such
language is deemed insufficient to avoid the restrictive judicial interpre-
tation of charter power, a county must comply with this interpretation.
This would mean that a charter county would have to amend its charter
each time it wished to exercise authority not expressly or necessarily im-
plied in its charter. This would be a troublesome procedure because each
charter amendment necessitates a countywide vote.2 5
It should be pointed out that statutes pertaining to a particular
class of counties continue to apply to a charter county unless conflicting
charter county enactments should prevail. This principle is illustrated
by the Readey case, where the St. Louis County Water Company, pursuant
to an ordinance of the county council, added fluoride ions to water
supplied to municipalities within the county. The Missouri Supreme
Court found the county had the power to do so, but the power was not
derived from article VI, section 18(c) of the constitution, because the
pre-1970 version of that section did not permit counties to legislate in
incorporated areas. Instead, the decision was based on a statute that
authorized first class counties to enact ordinances which enhance the
public health.26
Apportionment of powers between charter counties and the state
may best be analyzed in terms of: (1) the scope of a home rule county's
power in the absence of express constitutional or statutory prohibition
or authorization and (2) whether state or county enactments prevail when
there is a conflict between them.27 A careful distinction should be made
between the two situations. "It is one thing to argue that there should
be no limit on .. .power in the absence of an express prohibition; it
is quite another thing to argue that . . . enactments should prevail over
conflicting statutes." 28 The power of a charter county to act in the
absence of express prohibition is still somewhat open to question because
most cases have arisen in the context of a conflict between state and county
enactments. When such a conflict arises, the test now used by Missouri
courts was stated in State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Campbell:29 "When
a conflict occurs, the resolution thereof, as a general principle, depends
24. Article I, section 2 of the St. Louis County Charter as it then appeared
stated: "The County shall have all the powers now or hereafter vested by the
Constitution and laws of Missouri. ." The Missouri Supreme Court apparently
accepted this provision by stating:
It appears, therefore, that by virtue of the constitutional, statutory, and
charter provisions last above set forth, the county council was and is
authorized to enact ordinances tending to enhance the health of all the
residents of St. Louis County.
352 S.W.2d at 625.
25. Jackson County Charter art. XV (1970); St. Louis County Charter art.
X (1968).
26. § 192.300, RSMo 1959.
27. This analysis was used for home rule municipalities in Westbrook, supra
note 4, at 46.
28. Id. at 47.
29. 498 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
[Vol. 41
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on whether the functions are 'private, local corporate functions' or 'gov-
ernmental.' "30 For example, in Casper v. Hetlage3l it was stated that
zoning of a charter county was not a governmental matter over which
the state retained control.32
A governmental interest was found to exist in State ex rel. Cole v.
Matthews,3 3 where it was determined that St. Louis County could not
purchase voting machines from the lowest bidder. The State Board' of
Election Commissioners preferred another type of machine. Elections were
found to be governmental in nature, and the State Board prevailed. A
recent opinion of the Office of the St. Louis County Counselor concluded
that the county could not require an affidavit of value to be filed with
each deed recorded by the Recorder of Deeds because it was thought
to be preempted by the uniform statewide system of recording which
was governmental in nature.34
In St. Louis County v. City of Manchester35 a charter county's right
to plan and zone was determined to be local in nature and was given
precedence over a city's statutory power to acquire sewage disposal fa-
cilities outside city limits. This decision is often cited for the proposition
that when county planning and zoning efforts conflict with other statutes,
charter counties will prevail whereas statutory counties will not. This
is a result of comparing City of Manchester with State ex rel. Askew v.
Kopp,386 where residents of a statutory county sought to prevent the City
of Raytown from acquiring sewage facilities outside the city limits pur-
suant to statute. In Kopp the city's statutory power prevailed. The opinion
30. Id. at 836.
31. 359 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1962).
32. In Casper St. Louis County, being a charter county, could vest the man-
agement of the county business in some other agency than a county court. County
courts, which a statutory county must utilize, must unanimously vote to rezone,
pursuant to section 64.140, RSMo 1959. St. Louis County did not require a
unanimous vote of its council, and in Casper it was held that such power to rezone
was local in nature and was not subject to the legislative power of the state.
Id. at 790. See also State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County, 478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.
1972) (charter county had powers pertaining to planning and zoning outside
incorporated areas under old section 18(c)); Dahman v. City of Ballwin, 483 S.W.2d
605 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972) (charter county's zoning power is in the public
interest to promote public health and welfare).
33. 274 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. En Banc 1954).
34. St. Louis Co. Counselor Op. No. DL68-59 (July 18, 1975). The affidavit
was sought to aid the County Assessor in updating countywide property values.
The opinion was based primarily on Chapter 59, RSMo 1969, which pertains to
Recorders of Deeds, and Chapter 442, RSMo, which pertains to the conveyance
of real estate. The opinion concluded these statutes indicated "statewide' concern.
It is questionable, however, whether this is really a case where the action sought
by the county conflicts with and is preempted by existing statutes. In Blades v.
Hawkins, 133 Mo. App. 328, 112 S.W. 979 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908), affd per curiam,
240 Mo. 187, 144 S.W. 1198 (1912), the power of a statutory county to hire an
accountant to examine county records was implied from the express power
making the county court the fiscal agent of the county.
35. 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. En Banc 1962). The City of Manchester sought to
condemn land for such facilities pursuant to sections 71.680, 79.380, RSMo 1959.
36. 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
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in City of Manchester distinguished Kopp, however, because in the latter
case private landowners were contesting the City of Raytown's action.
No controversy between Jackson County and the City of Raytown existed.8 7
In Appelbaum v. St. Louis County38 the county was found to have the
power to acquire land for the purpose of constructing an incinerator.
The land sought by the county was inside an incorporated municipality
and use of the land for incinerator purposes conflicted with the munic-
ipality's zoning restrictions. With partial reliance on statutes pertaining
to first class counties, 89 the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
The County Council has acted pursuant to these [statutory and
charter] authorities, and its power with respect to enactment of
ordinances which tend to enhance public health is not limited to
the power conferred by Article VI, Section 18(c) of the Missouri
Constitution .... 40
Although the Missouri decisions do not clearly define the powers
charter counties may exercise in the absence of express statutory or con-
stitutional prohibition or authorization, a recent opinion by the Missouri
Supreme Court could be construed as defining such powers. In Flower
Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Louis County4l a county ordinance
required shopping centers which were located in unincorporated areas and
which had parking areas in excess of 200,000 square feet to provide outside
security protection for shoppers. The licensed watchmen were to be em-
ployed by the shopping centers, and they were to have full power of
arrest and the use of weapons. The watchmen were to be under the direc-
tion and supervision of the Superintendent of Police of St. Louis County.
The ordinance was challenged on constitutional grounds. The Missouri
Supreme Court, while finding the ordinance constitutional, concluded
that St. Louis County lacked the authority to enact the ordinance because
police protection was a matter of statewide concern. The court did not
indicate whether the ordinance was preempted by existing statutes or
constitutional provisions requiring police protection to be provided by
the county, or whether they viewed the ordinance as an attempt to leg-
islate in the absence of any applicable statutory or constitutional authori.
zation. Flower Valley indicated that it makes no difference whether the
charter county's ordinance conflicts and is therefore preempted by an
existing state statute, or whether the ordinance is an attempt to legislate
in the absence of any statutory authorization-in either case the test is
whether the activity is of statewide or local concern. In speaking of
article VI, section 18(b) of the constitution, the court stated:
37. 360 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
38. 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1970).
39. Section 49.303, RSMo 1969, and section 64.320, RSMo 1969, authorize
first class counties to acquire land by eminent domain for the protection of public
health, and to construct and operate incinerators and land fills.
40. Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107, 112 (Mo. 1970).
41. 528 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
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In our opinion, the question whether owners of private property
may be compelled to provide police protection for shoppers is
also one of state-wide concern and may not be addressed by coun-
ties without constitutional or statutory authority more explicit
than is found in Art. VI, § 18(b).4
The court made no mention of section 18(c), which designates powers
that charter counties may exercise. The fact that only unincorporated
areas of the county were affected by the ordinance seems to indicate
that St. Louis County contemplated section 18(c) when it enacted the ord-
inance, because "police and traffic" was one of four express areas in
which counties could legislate for unincorporated areas under the earlier
section 18(c). The court reasoned that allowing such action by a county
could result in the apportionment of police and fire services to poten-
tially troublesome areas, with the resulting cost being assessed to the
private landowners in those areas. This policy reasoning is understand-
able, but the decision completely avoids the issue of whether a charter
county has the authority to take such action under section 18(c).
B. The Impact of the 1970 Amendment
The 1970 amendment to section 18(c) 43 consists of two paragraphs,
the first of which expands the legislative power that charter counties
may exercise outside incorporated areas of the county. Originally au-
thorized to legislate "pertaining to public health, police and traffic,
building construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the county
outside incorporated cities. . ,"44 charter counties are no longer limited
to the four listed categories but may now legislate pertaining to "any and
all services and functions of any municipality or political subdivision,
except school districts, in the part of the county outside incorporated
cities. . ... 45
The second paragraph of the 1970 amendment allows charter counties
to exercise power pertaining to "all services and functions of any mu-
nicipality or subdivision, except school districts, throughout the entire
county within as well as outside incorporated municipalities . . ."46 This
paragraph had no earlier counterpart. The prerequisites to the exercise of
such countyvide power are probably the most important feature of the
1970 amendment to section 18 (c).
One article suggests that countywide action cannot be taken by
legislative enactment of the county because such measures must be sub-
mitted to the county voters.47 The second paragraph of section 18(c),
with reference to the exercise of countywide legislative power, reads in
pertinent part:
42. Id. at 754.
43. The amendment is set out at pt. I of this comment, supra.
44. Mo. CONSr. art. VI, § 18(c).
45. Mo. CONSr'. art. VI, § 18(c) 1970 amend.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Freilich, Robards 8& Wilson, supra note 9, at 332.
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The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legisla-
tive power.., any such charter provision shall set forth the limits
within which the municipalities may exercise the same power....
When such a proposition is submitted to the voters of the
County.... (emphasis added).
The initial part of the paragraph indicates such action might be taken
by the exercise of legislative power by the county, but the latter part of
the paragraph contemplates a countywide vote. Reading the paragraph
as a whole, it rather clearly indicates that a charter amendment is necessary
for any countywide measure.
St. Louis County officials also believe that countywide measures re-
quire a charter amendment. St. Louis County has made the only attempt
thus far to utilize the 1970 amendment. In 1971, ordinances calling for
charter amendments were passed by the county legislative body. The three
proposed charter amendments were all defeated at the November 2, 1971
election. The first amendment called for 24-hour police protection for all of
St. Louis County, the second for the adoption of a countywide minimum
housing code, and the third for the adoption of a countywide building
code. 4s The charters of both St. Louis County and Jackson County were
written prior to the 1970 constitutional amendment, and both charters
attempt to include all powers subsequently given charter counties by
statute or in the constitution.49 St. Louis County, however, required a
countywide vote and did not attempt to rely on such language in its charter.
Neither Jackson County nor St. Louis County have current plans to
48. The charter amendments, if adopted, would have consisted of the fol-
lowing:
1) Said charter as amended would require each city, county, town or village
police department in St. Louis County to provide patrol services and preliminary
investigative services at all times, and create a Police Standards Commission to
determine compliance with this requirement and further authorize the County
Council, after hearing, to direct the County Police Department to perform such
services where the responsible police department had failed to comply with this
requirement, the cost of such additional services to be paid by St. Louis County,
to be reimbursed by any municipality receiving such services;
2) Said charter as amended would authorize the County Council to enact
and provide for the enforcement of uniform building construction codes through-
out St. Louis County at the County's expense and to provide the terms on which
any municipality or fire district may enforce any such code at its own expense,
and would authorize any political subdivision to enact different provisions after
public hearing, and would also provide for enlarging the existing Building Com-
mission and the creation of the City Selection Committee and a Fire Safety Ad-
visory Board;
3) Said charter as amended would authorize the County Council to enact and
provide for the enforcement of a uniform housing code throughout St. Louis
County at the County's expense and to provide the terms on which any municipal-
ity may adopt and enforce such a code at its own expense, would provide for a
distribution of part of the County's expenditures to such municipalities, and
would also provide for the creation of a Housing Code Commission and a City
Selection Committee.
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Nov. 1, 1971, at 1-A, col 1.
49. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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propose any charter amendments, 50 indicating that no judicial decision
under the 1970 amendment will be immediately forthcoming. The con-
struction and interpretation of the 1970 amendment to section 18(c) must
await judicial determination, but certain issues concerning the amend-
ment that seem likely to arise in the future will be discussed in this
comment.
IV. THE 1970 AmENDMENT: ISSUES AND CONSTRUCTION
A. The County's Basic Authority Redefined?
The cases decided prior to the 1970 amendment limited a charter
county's power to legislate to matters of local concern, 51 as opposed to
matters of governmental or statewide concern. The earlier section 18(c)
specified four areas in which counties had legislative power: public health,
police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning. The
1970 amendment speaks of "any and all services and functions of any
municipality or political subdivision." It can be argued this changes the
test for when and on what matters a county may act. The term "services"
may indicate only those services which were formerly provided by a mu-
nicipality, or "functions" may expand the authority to other areas. "Func-
tions" seems to be a much broader term than "services" and may include
implementing or regulating local policy rather than merely the per-
formance of services.52 It is possible, however, that "services and func-
tions" was intended to include only services otherwise awkward or
impossible to fit under public health, police and traffic, building con-
struction, and planning and zoning-the enumerated categories of the
earlier section 18(c). Nevertheless, "services and functions" seem to indi-
cate that something more was intended under section 18(c), as amended,
than under the prior section.
The second paragraph of the 1970 amendment 53 empowers charter
counties to legislate countywide when approved by county vote. The
last part of that paragraph states that "the ballot shall contain a dear
definition of the power, function or service to be performed. . . ." Here
"power" is added to "function or service." "Power" did not appear in
paragraph one or in the first part of paragraph two. Such a term, when
coupled with function and service, seems to indicate that the amendment
changes a charter county's basic authority. Because "power" was not used
in paragraph one, it could be argued that charter counties have less au-
50. Telephone interview with the Office of County Counsel of both Jackson
and St. Louis Counties, July, 1975.
51. Casper v. Hetlage, 359 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1962); State ex rel. St. Louis
County v. Campbell, 498 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
52. In State ex rel. Cole v. Matthews, 274 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. En Banc 1954)
a charter county was held not to have the power to purchase voting machines
from the lowest bidder, as elections were said to be governmental in nature. If
the case had arisen under the 1970 amendment to section 18(c), the result might
have been different.
53. The amendment is set out at pt. I of this comment, supra.
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thority when legislating for unincorporated areas. It remains an open
question whether a charter county's basic authority has been altered to
exceed the power of providing constitutionally required services and
determining the manner in which they are to be provided. Section 18(c),
as amended, provides an argument that a charter county's authority has
been redefined.
B. Instrument of Grant or Limitation?
By definition, an instrument of grant gives charter counties only
those powers which are specified or necessarily implied in their charters.
An instrument of limitation, on the other hand, gives charter counties
all powers not prohibited by the constitution or by the charter. It is
clear from the language of section 18(c), as amended, that county charters
are instruments of grant.
Language in Jackson County's charter states:
The county shall have all powers possible for a county to have
under the constitution and laws of Missouri, as fully and com-
pletely as though they were specifically enumerated in this char-
ter... and all powers not expressly prohibited by the constitution,
or by this charter.54
'Whether this language will be successful in creating an instrument of
limitation has not been answered by the courts. If the courts view such
language as being ineffective in creating an instrument of limitation,
county legislation that was otherwise local in nature could be invalidated
if power to enact such legislation was not provided for in the county
charter.55
An argument against allowing such expansive language to create
an instrument of limitation is that section 18(c) is concerned with the
difficult subject of intergovernmental relations. Such matters should be
defined as dearly as possible in the charter. An instrument of limitation
would give a county all powers not expressly prohibited in the charter.
This would arguably result in less clarity, because there would be powers
existing outside the instrument.
C. Constitutional Conflicts
If a state statute provides the terms under which a charter county can
provide countywide services, the question arises whether the statute is
unconstitutional because of a conflict with sections 18(b) and 18(c) of
the Missouri constitution. Section 18(b) says in pertinent part:
The charter shall provide for ... the form of the county govern-
ment, the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms of office and
salaries of the county officers, and for the exercise of all powers
and duties of counties and the county officers. . ..
It can be argued that a statute allowing a charter county to provide
54. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
55. Freilich, Robards & Wilson, supra note 9, at 338.
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/9
COUNTY HOME RULE
county-wide services would be unconstitutional, because charter counties
retain freedom, to choose the manner in which -to perform the services
required by the constitution.56 A state statute may require the result, but
where it also prescribes the manner in which the result shall be obtained,
a constitutional question is presented. For example, assume that a state
statute required all charter counties to provide a countywide system of
mosquito control, and that the system be implemented by a Mosquito
Control Supervisor who must not be a part of any other department or
agency of county government. It could be argued that the statute would
be -unconstitutional because it dictates the manner in which the service
is to be provided.
Where provisions of a county charter conflict with provisions of a
charter of a city within the charter county, the question arises as to
which governmental entity should prevail. For example, if a charter
county enacted a uniform countywide building code 57 and a charter city
within the county persisted in utilizing a less stringent code, a constitu-
tional conflict would be presented. The Missouri constitution provides for
both charter counties and charter cities. 58 In St. Louis County v. City of
Manchester59 the city sought to acquire land outside the city limits for
purposes of sewage disposal. The action was pursuant to statute, but was
contrary to the planning and zoning provisions of St. Louis County. St.
Louis County prevailed in that case, but the decision does not answer the
question posed because Manchester was not a charter city. In fact, the
Missouri Supreme Court declined to determine whether the county or
the city "occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy." 60
It would seem that in keeping with the spirit of the 1970 constitutional
amendment to section 18(c), the charter county should prevail. Section
18(c) requires a countywide vote. A charter city should not be able to
act contrary to the county charter when the county acts pursuant to a
majority vote of the residents of the county, which includes the voters of
the charter city. A contrary argument is based on the doctrine that when
there is conflict between two entities of government, the smallest local
unit of self government should prevail.
D. Problems of Interpretation
The last sentence of the second paragraph of amended section 18(c)
states that when countywide action is submitted to a vote, the ballot shall
contain "a clear definition of the power, function or service to be per-
formed and the method by which it will be financed." It could be argued
that the language having to do with the method of financing limits
56. Hellman v. St. Louis County, 302 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Mo. 1957); State v.
Gamble, 865 Mo. 215, 224, 280 S.W.2d 656, 660 (En Banc 1955).
57. St. Louis County sought to enact such a provision in 1971, but was un-
successful.
58. Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 18(a), 19.
59. 860 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
60. Id. at 642.
19761
13
Gump: Grump: Local Government-
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
62 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
countywide ,action, to powers, functions, and services which incur debt
and eliminates those powers, functions, and services of a regulatory nature
which are enforced or carried out by an existing county office. Additional
expense would undoubtedly be incurred for these regulatory functions,
but the expense may be absorbed by the county operating budget and
not require additional revenue measures. It seems doubtful that such a
construction was intended because this would force the charter .county
to incur additional debt each time it attempts to implement countywide
measures, and incurring such debt should not be encouraged. Moreover,
because incurring additional debt usually has little voter appeal, many
countywide measures would be doomed to failure in a countywide election.
The word. "clear" appearing in the last sentence of the second para-
graph of section 18(c) may present a point of challenge to future charter
amendments. A "clear" definition of the power, function, or service to
.be performed .and the method by which it will be financed would be
difficult to present in some cases. It seems doubtful that courts would give
a broad scope of review to a challenge that the ballot did not contain a
"clear" definition of the proposal. The acceptance of such an argument
would allow belated attacks on countywide legislation by parties who, if
genuinely interested or affected, could have asked for clarification prior
to submission to county vote. Another argument for a narrow scope of
judicial review was stated in Windle v. Lambert:61 "The general rule is
that courts will -not inquire into the motives of Legislatures where they
possess the power to act and it has been exercised as prescribed by
law. .... ,62 By analogy, if a charter county legislature has complied with
the state constitution and its own charter in enacting legislation, its enact-
ments should be subject to the same rule.
The second paragraph of amended section 18(c), having to do with
countywide services and functions, states that any such charter provision
"shall set forth the limits within which the municipalities may exercise
the same power collaterally and coextensively." There are at least three
ways this language could be construed. First of all, the phrase may imply
that the right to exercise the same power collaterally and coextensively
always resides in the city, and that this residual role may prevent the county
from completely taking over a service or function. Second, it may mean
that the city's collateral and coextensive power, if it exists at all in a
particular case, is to be limited by the charter amendment. Finally, this
particular phrase omits "political subdivision," which was used earlier
in the paragraph in conjunction with "municipality." This may indicate
that if the county wants to contract with any political subdivision other
than a city-e.g., a special road district, the charter does not have to set
forth the limits for collateral and coextensive exercise of the same power
by the political subdivision.
61. 400 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1966).
62. Id. at 93.
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The question whether a county can perform a countywide service
without all cities in the county having the same power may arise under
section 18(c). The second paragraph of section 18(c) refers to the "exer-
cise of legislative power pertaining to any and all services and functions
of any municipality or subdivision... throughout the entire county...."
Because of the language of amended section 18(c) refers to any municipal-
ity, it suggests that it is not necessary for all cities to have the power.
Article VI, section 16 of the Missouri constitution provides:
Any municipality or political subdivision of thig state may con-
tract and cooperate with other municipalities or political subdi-
visions thereof . for the planning, development, construction,
acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or
fdr a common service, in the manner provided by law.
Section 70.220, RSMo 1969, was enacted to implement article VI, section
16 of the Missouri c6nstitution.63 This statute requires that the subject
or purpose of any contract or cooperative action be within the scope of
the power of each municipality or subdivision. Because article VI, section
16 implies, that each municipality or subdivision shall have coextensive
power, it is questionable that this conflicts with section 18(c) as amended,
which allows counties to legislate countywide when approved by county
vote. Section 16, by the use of the language "may contract," speaks in terms
of voluntary action or cooperation. In contrast, section 18(c) speaks of
powers vested in a charter county by reason of its charter, the exercise
of these countywide powers, and the implementation of countywide pro-
grams. Because of this difference in intent, it is improbable that each
municipality and political subdivision in a county must have reciprocal
power before a charter county could adopt countywide measures.
E. Proposed Constitutional Amendments
A Senate joint resolution introduced in the last General Assembly 64
called for the submission to Missouri voters of amendments to sections
18(a),. 18(b), and 18(f) of article VI of the Missouri constitution. The
amendments to section 18(a) and 18(f) would have lowered the population
requirement for charter counties from 85,000 to 80,000 inhabitants, and
lowered the percentage of county voters required for a petition for a
charter commission from 20 to 8 percent of the total vote cast for governor
at the last general election. The amendment to section 18(b) would have
63. in School District of Kansas City v. Kansas City, 382 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.
En Banc 1964), the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
Section 70.220 follows the language of the constitutional provision, § 16
of Art. 6, but further spells out the requirement implicit in the Consti-
tution that the subject and purposes of the cooperative contract or action
shall be within the scope of the powers of the municipality or subdi-
vision...
Id. at -692.
64. Senate Joint Resolution No. 17, introduced in the First Regular Ses-
sion, 78th General Assembly (1974) by Senators Marshall and Wiggins.
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substituted "not prohibited" for "prescribed" in section 18(b), so that it
would have read as follows:
The charter shall provide for its amendment, for the form of the
county government, the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms
of office and salaries of the county officers, and for the exercise
of all powers and duties of counties and county officers [pre-
scribed] not prohibited by the constitution and laws of the state.0 5
The latter proposed amendment was intended to give charter coun-
ties greater powers,66 presumably in areas where there are no conflicting
legislative or constitutional provisions. There was some thought that the
legislature could act in matters of purely local concern under the prior
section 18(b). Where such a conflict occurs, and the matter is actually
determined to be local, the charter county should prevail under the
constitution as it now reads, provided the county has appropriate au-
thority in its charter. The amendment was opposed by the two charter
counties, St. Louis County and Jackson County, because they believed
that the present section 18(b) was adequate, and they were content with
its provisions.6r The resolution was passed in the Senate, but was not
acted upon by the House. If passed, the proposed section 18(b) would
change county charters from instruments of grant to instruments of lim-
itation, by the use of language similar to that found in both the Jackson
County and St. Louis County charters. 69 The charter counties apparently
believe that the language in their charters is sufficient and wish no further
tampering with section 18(b).69 It appears that there will be no further
immediate attempts to amend section 18(b), because the authors of the
proposed amendment will probably defer to the judgment of the charter
counties. There will, however, be further attempts to amend sections
18(a) and 18(f)70 inregard to the population requirement for charter
counties.
V. "OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
With the addition' of Jackson County as a charter county and the
possibility of more counties obtaining charters in the near future, the
65. Id.
66. Telephone interview with State Senator Larry Marshall, 19th District,
July 31, 1975.
67. Telephone interview with the Office of County Counsel of both Jackson
and St. Louis Counties, July 1975.
68. Jackson County Charter art. I, § 3 (1970); St. Louis County Charter art.
1, § 1.030 (1968).
69. Telephone interview with the Office of County Counsel of both Jackson
and St. Louis Counties, July 1975.
70. A 'measure which would grant the power to form charter governments
to all of Missouri's counties was approved by the Missouri House and sent to the
Senate for further consideration. This measure would eliminate the present 85,000
population requirement. Because such a measure would amend the state consti-
tution, if approved by the Senate, it will also have to be approved by a majority
of the voters in a statewide election, Columbia Daily-Tribune, Jan. 15, 1976, at 3,
col. 4. 1 " : !,I
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permissible scope of a charter county's power to legislate under section
18(c) will become increasingly important.
The legality or constitutionality of a particular action is not the
only problem charter counties face. Under the 1970 amendment, counties
can now legislate countywide if there is a charter amendment approved
by county voters. Political considerations, however, may restrict the use
of countywide legislation. Rather than viewing charters as county self-
government or as home rule, residents of outlying areas of the counties
may view them as similar to big city government or as another layer of
government being imposed on them. Outlying municipalities often feel
disenfranchised by attempts of others to act within their boundaries. At
least three reasons were given by incorporated areas within the county
for the opposition and ultimate defeat of the three St. Louis County pro-
posals: (1) anticipated higher taxes; (2) county takeover of municipal-
ities; and (3) countywide building and housing codes containing less
stringent provisions than the existing municipal codes." 1 Even with the
failure of such attempts at countywide measures, such attempts may have
value in bringing about the desired result through contract and compro-
mise, at least where incorporated areas fear a different result at a later
election.
The desirability and potential success of county home rule may well
turn on the geographical make-up of a county. St. Louis County is more
or less homogeneous and to a large extent incorporated. This situation
lends itself more readily to the concept of home rule. Jackson County, on
the other hand, contains two large cities, Kansas City and Independence,
with almost one-third of the remaining county being unincorporated.72
The budget of the City of Kansas City is approximately twice that of
Jackson County.73 In addition to problems of political division, this
creates funding problems for Jackson County, because it must come up
with an attractive program to persuade the voters to approve countywide
action, particularly where the action requires incurring additional debt.
Kansas City presently provides services to a large percentage of the county
voters, and these voters may be content with such services.
County government may seek to overcome such problems by showing
out-county areas the benefits of county home rule. Current plans in Jackson
County are to improve out-county relations with programs of bridge and
road improvement. There is also some discussion of eventual consolidation
of countywide logistical functions. 4
Though home rule provides counties with powers not found in statutes,
what home rule can offer a lightly urbanized county is subject to con-
jecture at this point. County home rule has met with two recent failures
71. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 28, 1971, at 6W.
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